Category Archives: DNSSEC

Paper Notes: Redirecting DNS for Ads and Profit

Redirecting DNS for Ads and Profit is one of the collection of papers from the ICSI team, with the results from the Netalyzr, network diagnosis tool. This paper focuses on the 66K session traces where DNS error traffic has been monetization and calls out Paxfire, for their role in this area, the paper focuses on NXDOMAIN wildcarding and search engine proxying (see my past post on how middleboxes interfere with DNS for an introduction to these techniques). The authors acknowledge the unrepresentative sample of Netalyzr users and the high number of sessions using OpenDNS or Comcast DNS resolvers.

NXDOMAIN wildcarding is not encouraged by ICANN and can have serious implications for non web browser DNS traffic (some resolvers only rewrite lookups starting with www. to try to prevent this). In many cases, redirection servers do not simply use HTTP 302.

The highlight of this paper was the fake NXDOMAIN opt-out offered by Paxfire, where the ad server simply served the user’s browser’s error page.

DNSSEC may provide authenticated denial of existence but this doesn’t necessarily fix the problem, for example Xerocole offers DNS resolvers with the option to simply rewrite DNSSEC signed NXDOMAIN responses without a signature, thus assuming the client will not validate DNSSEC.

OpenDNS wildcards NXDOMAIN and SERVFAIL errors as well as directing users to the redirection server if there server supports only IPv6. This is provided as an option in D-Link routers.

The study observed >12 ISPs using squid proxies to redirect search engine traffic. The study did not observe resolver independent NXDOMAIN redirection but did see NATs redirecting all DNS requests (regardless of resolver) to the configured recursive resolver, thus creating in-path NXDOMAIN rewriting if the new resolver uses NXDOMAIN wildcarding.

This paper is a fun, light read that I would recommend, though its results are a bit out of date now, as it used data from Jan 2010 to May 2011.

Middleboxes considered harmful: DNS Edition

This article is brief overview of how middleboxes interact with DNS traffic. In particular I’m interested in finding out the answers to the following: Will middleboxes drop/modify DNS traffic and what is the purpose of this: stopping abuse, security, buggy implementations, advertising or censorship? Therefore does using your own stub resolver and recursive nameserver free you from the above issues? Do DNS recursive nameservers with caching respect the TTL? And ultimately how does the all this affect the deploy of DNS extensions such as DNSSEC, DNSCurve, DynDNS, EDNS?

My particular interest in DNS is how will research projects for naming edge network devices (e.g. HIP, UIA, UIP, MobilityFirst, CoDoNS, FERN) actually fair in the wild and is using or extending DNS a way around such issues. The title of this article is play on the title of the paper describing Delegation-Oriented Architecture.

Applications & Stub Resolvers

Stub resolver are in essence the clients to the Domain Name System (DNS), they sit between applications and DNS, usually ran locally by the OS and interfaced with by gethostbyname. The stub resolver is responsible for forming and parsing DNS packets for the application, offering a simple API to application for resolving domain names into IP address. The simplicity of this API is also its downfail, for example, gethostbyname has few error codes compared to DNS’s RCODEs. Proponents of DNSSEC hope that web browsers will present DNS validation failures to users in the same way that TLS failures are presented. At the moment however, for many stub resolvers the only possible error codes (often called h_errno) are HOST_NOT_FOUND, TRY_AGAIN, NO_RECOVERY and NO_ADDRESS. The application may not ever get this much information depending on the language API, such as Unix.gethostbyname in OCaml’s standard library.

A common linux default is to request AAAA records as well as A records even if the host doesn’t have a IPv6 address. Kreibich et al found that 13% of all sessions requested AAAA records: 42% of linux session requested AAAA records, compared to 10% of non-linux sessions, backing up this theory.

Some stub resolvers and client applications cache DNS responses, interestingly some do not respect TTLs. For example, the default cache time for ncsd (enabled by default on some linux distros) is 15 mins regardless of TTL, whereas internet explorer caches all records for 30 mins. It is important the caches respect short TTLs as they are increasingly utilised by content distribution networks and dynamic DNS. A quick check on my own browser (go to chrome://net-internals/#dns in chorme) shows that the browser cache contains 73 A/AAAA active records and 263 expired records.

Weaver et al. and Kreibich et al. studied how middleboxes interact with DNS traffic using the Netalyzr tool. Weaver et al. concluded that application wishing to use non-standard resource records (RRs) including TXT resources or DNSSEC should use their own DNS resolver and bypass the stub resolver provided by the host. It is often not possible for an application to overwrite the stub resolver’s choice of DNS resolver, which is normally a DNS resolver at the gateway, with a host of problems (see next section). The study also concluded that host stub resolvers often lack failovers (e.g. trying requests over TCP) to common issues such as: the gateway resolver not supporting the full DNS protocol, the gateway resolver cannot be trusted, the gateway resolver may be slow and the network gateway/middleboxes may filter UDP traffic.

In-Gateway Resolvers

The gateway resolver is a common (but not necessary) stage in DNS resolution (there may also be multiple stages of gateway resolvers). The stub resolver running on local host will usually forward the DNS query to the resolver(s) whos address it was given by DHCP lease when connecting to the local router. This address is normally a DNS resolver running at the gateway (at the .1 or .254 address in the local subnet e.g. 192.168.1.x) . I say “usually” as this can be overwritten, for example some people instead opt to use a public DNS server such as Google’s or OpenDNS, or run their own resolver, this is of course rare. Furthermore, not all gateways run DNS resolvers, in this case they typically refer hosts straight to the ISPs resolvers. Gateway resolvers have the advantage that they can enable the local resolution of domain such as .local or domain name for router adminisation (e.g. for Netgear devices).

Weaver et al. tested the whether in-gateway resolvers correctly processed various DNS queries, they found that following: AAAA lookup (96%), TXT RRs (92%), unknown RRs (91%) and EDNS0 (91%). They also found that a significant number of in-gateway resolver are externally usable, opening the gateway to DoS attacks.

ISPs (& Other) Resolvers

The ISP’s resolver is a common (but not necessary) stage in DNS resolution (there many also be multiple stages of ISP resolvers). The ISP resolver is often the resolver responsible for begin to the actual resolution instead of just forwarding/proxying queries.

Despite there widespread deployment and dedicated management, these resolvers are not without there problems. Weaver et al found that 4% of sessions did not implement source port randomisation, only 55% of sessions exhibit EDNS0 usage, 4% of sessions implemented 0x20 whilst 94% propagate capitalisation unmodified. Kreibich et al found that 49% of sessions used DNSSEC enabled resolvers.

DNSSEC capable resolvers by Matthäus Wander

NXDOMAIN wildcarding is where resolvers replaces responses with the NXDOMAIN error (for example, when a user mistypes a domain) with valid DNS responses point to another site, often with advertising. Weaver et al observed this in 24% of the sessions surveyed. This should only be done on queries from web browsers, though this is not always the case. This may also interact with web browsers who treat NXDOMAIN errors specifically, e.g. if the query fails due to NXDOMAIN, then suggest some likely alternatives. Worryingly, Weaver et al also observed a few cases of SERVFAIL wildcarding, IPv4 addresses in responses where IPv6 only was requested and ignoring additional answer RRs. Some resolvers redirect queries for some search engine, whilst other have malware to inject adverting. Kreibich et al found that essentially all resolver respected a 0 and 1 second TTL.

Another interesting area is the treatment of RRs from the Authority and Additional RR sets. For example, glue records are A RRs in the Additional section added to an answer with NS RRs which put the name servers under the domain they control, without these additional RR’s we would have a circular dependency. Kreibich et al found that 61% of sessions accept glue records when the glue records refer to authoritative nameservers, 25% accept A records corresponding to CNAMEs contained in the reply and 21% of sessions accepting any glue records present in the Additional field, and those only doing so for records for subdomains of the authoritative server.

Other ISP controlled middleboxes

It is clear that resolvers (stub, in-gateway and ISP/Public) do not reliability handle all DNS traffic and all its extensions. Users could opt to run there own resolver and stub resolvers, would this mean that their traffic be free from modification by middleboxes? Of course not.

ISPs have been know to highjack traffic to port 53 to their own DNS resolvers or simply drop it, blocking use of third party DNS resolvers. Some public resolvers support alternative ports (e.g. OpenDNS supports port 5353), but this can be difficult to configure as its cannot be easily expressed in /etc/resolv.conf. There is some evidence of gateways provided by ISPs, redirecting traffic to port 53 to the ISP’s DNS resolvers

TLDs and Root Servers

The root DNS server (or actually the 504 servers, 13 addresses) is the heart of the DNS. The root has supported DNSSEC since 2010, will not support DNSCurve. Likewise many of the TLD’s support DNSSEC and will not support DNSCurve. On the whole, these seems to fairly well managed and free of major issues.

Comcast blocking

Today, people love to hate their ISPs, they have a public image problem. A great example of this when Comcast apparently blocking NASA’s website in 2012. In fact, Comcast was the only major US ISP to be using DNSSEC validating resolvers thus where the only ones affected when NASA’s website failed to properly sign their DNS responses. Poor Comcast.

On January 18, 2012, the NASA.GOV domain had a DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) signing error that blocked access to all NASA.GOV sites when using DNS recursive resolvers performing DNSSEC validation. As one of the largest ISPs in the world utilizing DNSSEC validation, users of Comcast noticed a problem when attempting to connect to the website. This caused some people to incorrectly interpret this as Comcast purposely blocking access to NASA.GOV and recommending users switch from Comcast security-aware DNS resolvers to resolvers not performing DNSSEC validation … Instead, the administrators of the NASA.GOV domain had enabled DNSSEC signing for their domain, and the security signatures in their domain were no longer valid. The Comcast DNS resolvers correctly identified the DNSSEC signature errors and responded with a failure to Comcast customers. This is the expected result when a domain can no longer be validated, and this protects users from a potential security threat


Video: An overview of secure name resolution [29c3]

Here is an excellent talk by Matthäus Wander, introducing DNSSEC, DNSCurve and few other DNS extensions.


A few points of interest:

  • stub resolvers need new API’s to report DNSSEC validation failures, then browsers can provides users with “TLS like” failure messages
  • AD flag is useless as there is no validation, yet windows 7/8 still read it
  • Comcast name servers support DNSSEC, though this hasn’t work out great for them
  • Some ISP redirect NXDOMAIN responses, another reason to run your own DNS resolver or use a public one.
  • The root server and big TLDs will not deploy DNSCurve
  • DNSSEC cannot be used directly to validate the DNSCurve public key, stored in the domain name of the parent NS record, as DNSSEC does not sign the domain name.

Matthäus’s slides are online.

DNSSEC – A basic Intro

This article aims to not just explain how DNSSEC work but why the protocols are designed the way that they are. I will begin with a simple mental model of public-key cryptography, then I highlight issues with scheme described so far and add complexity to fix issues as I highlight them. I finish the article with a simplified model of DNSSEC and a range of problems/question that I hope to explore in the next article.

DNSSEC is a collection of IETF specifications for securing DNS data. It is a set of extensions to DNS which provide to DNS resolvers with:

  • origin authentication of DNS data
  • authenticated denial of existence
  • data integrity

It does not provide the DNS resolvers with:

  • availability
  • confidentiality, DNSSEC results are not encrypted
  • protection from user mistakes/assumptions

DNSSEC aims to adds security to DNS, while maintaining backwards compatibility.

RFC 3833

DNSSEC protects DNS resolvers from forged DNS data, by digitally signing all DNSSEC replies. The DNS resolver is then able to check if the information it receives is identical to that information on the authoritative DNS server.

DNSSEC can also protect information such as cryptographic certificates stored in CERT records in DNS.

RFC 4398

RFC 4367

Negative article on DNSSEC

DNSSEC-bis is the name of the DNSSEC specification and the related RFCs are
4033 introduction & requirements, 4034 resource records for DNSSEC and 4035 on protocol modifications.

Public-key cryptography is the use of two keys, one public and one private to encrypt and decrypt a message. A message before encryption is referred to as plain text and a message after encryption is referred to as cipher text.

Public-key cryptography can be used to provide confidentiality or authentication.

To provide confidentiality, the public key is used for encryption so anyone can write a message but only the intended recipient has the private key which is used for decryption, so the only person who can decrypt the message is intended recipient.

To provide origin authentication, the private key is used for encryption so the only person who can send an encrypted message is the intended source. Then the public key is used for decryption so anyone can read the message, provided it was written by the intended source.

Figure 1 – How public key cryptography can be used to provide authentication or confidentiality

DNSSEC works by digitally signing the results of DNS look-ups using public-key cryptography. It uses public-key cryptography to provide authentication not confidentiality. This means that private key is used for encryption and the public key is used for decryption. So when a DNS resolver makes a DNSSEC query, then the response will be signed by the correct information source and then the DNS resolver will use the public key to decrypt the response, knowing the response is reliable as it was definitely send by the intended source.

So that’s the problem solved, the DNS responses will be encrypted by correct source and then all the DNS resolvers will decryption the responses using the public key. This ensures that the response was sent by the correct source so it provides source authentication as well an data integrity as it was signed using a private key.

Except that this model completely ignores the details of how DNS actually generates the replies to DNS query and what exactly is the “intended source” in this context.

So now I want to explain why the basic public-key cryptography scheme that I outline is not sufficient to provide authentication.

The cryptography scheme aimed to provide authentication between the DNS resolver and the source of the DNS response, but it didn’t consider the details of how this DNS response was generated.

The actually answer is that the “intended source” in DNS is an Authoritative Name Server, There are many authoritative name server forming a distributed database, each authoritative name server responses to a specific subset of the DNS queries.

The DNS resolver needs to locate the relevant authoritative name server, this is achieved through a chain of domain name servers, either recursively, iteratively or a hybrid of them both.

To generate the response to a DNS query for the DNS resolver, there are a series of request-replies. So for DNSSEC to meet its primary goal of providing authenticated responses, there needs to be authentication throughout the chain between the DNS resolver and the intended source, which is the authoritative name server.  When a DNSSEC enabled DNS resolver gets a response then it can use the public key to check that it was encrypted by the authoritative name server.

So now we have fixed the problem … Actually not

This solution would require that all DNS resolvers change because all DNS resolvers need to decrypt the DNSSEC response using the public key to get the the normal DNS response. Given that DNSSEC nees to be backwards compatible with DNS, this means we need to alter the above scheme.

So instead of encrypting and decrypting the whole DNS response, why don’t we add some text to the DNS response as another resource record and then encrypt and decrypt that text instead. This means that DNS resolvers that are not DNSSEC compatible can simply ignore the extra resource records. This extra bit of information therefore acts as a digital signature. This is actually used in DNSSEC and the new resource record is called RRSIG.

Now we have DNS record with an extra resource record called RRSIG, the authoritative name server has the private key and the DNS resolver use the public key to check that the DNS information received was from an authoritative name server. But where do the DNS resolvers get the public key from ?

A simple idea would be to have a single server with all public keys on, then all DNSSEC enabled resolvers could just request the public key from the central server. This is fundamentally flawed as its a centralized system which would completely defeat the purpose of DNS, which is to act as a distributed system.

Therefore we need a distributed system of our own to get the public keys to the DNSSEC enabled resolvers, why not use a system like DNS or even DNSSEC ?

DNSSEC gets the public key, from the authoritative name server to the DNSSEC enabled resolver by introducing another new resource record called DNSKEY. This has the public key in it so that the DNS resolver can use it to verify the RRSIG.

Done ? Nope of course not …

So its easy to assume that we finished here but as we developed the scheme we have actually introduced new issues, for example we have lost any data integrity. Its easy for a 3rd party to intersect a DNS query, change the data in the resources and set it forward to its destination. The DNSSEC enabled resolver would be nun the wiser, as the response to the DNSSEC query is still correctly signed and will have the correct RRSIG.

We can fix they by making the plain text in the RRSIG, a hash of the original message. This means that if the messaged is changed in transit then the DNS resolver will detect it because after decrypting the RRSIG text and hashing the other resource records, the results will no longer be the same because the hash generated from the DNSSEC response will be different to the RRSIG one as the text has been changed.

Lets review where we have got to so far…

DNSSEC uses public-key cryptography to provide authentication and data integrity between authoritative name servers and DNS resolvers. It does this using two new resource records, RRSIG and DNSKEY.

The authoritative name server hashes the RRs and then uses a private key to encode this hash, the result is placed in the RRSIG record and the public key is placed in the DNSKEY record. Then the DNS response moves though a chain of domain name servers to the DNS resolver. If the DNS resolver supports DNSSEC then it will use the public key in the DNSKEY record to decrypt the RRSIG, this will give a hash of the other RRs, the resolver can then hash the other RRs and compare the results.

So what is this public-key cryptography algorithm that DNSSEC uses and whats going to happen if its broken in the future ?

DNSSEC doesn’t use a specific algorithm. Both DNSKEY and RRSIG have a 8 bit number, which corresponds to the algorithm used, details of with values correspond to which algorithms is available here

This scheme has a big problem though…

Consider the following situation, I am an evil 3rd party would wants to return the incorrect DNS respond to a (DNSSEC enable) DNS resolver :

  1. The (DNSSEC enable) DNS resolver places a DNS request for
  2. I spot this and I want to send a reply to this DNS request that will not be from the authoritative name server, managed by Google
  3. So I’m going to make my own response and make it appear as its has comes from the authoritative name server
  4. I create RR with the incorrect information and I then come up with my own public and private key pair, using the private key to encrypt the hash in the RRSIG and then place the public key in the DNSKEY record
  5. The DNS resolver then decrypts the RRSIG record using the key in the DNSKEY and checks that its a hash of the other RR records
  6. The DNS resolver believes that the response is from the authoritative name server at google

The problem is the above situation is that although the RRSIG and DNSKEY resource records aim to authenticate the other resource records, there is nothing to prevent a 3rd party changing the RRSIG and the DNSKEY. What we need is a method of authenticating the DNSKEY.

If we assume for a moment that the DNSKEY is authenticated, then a (DNSSEC enable) DNS resolver will be able to detect if the other resource records have been changed. As the decrypted RRSIG will not be a hash of the other resource records. If a evil 3rd party also when tries to also change the RRSIG value, so that the decrypted RRSIG is a hash of the changes made, then they can do this only if they know the private key. But they do not know the private key used and they cannot replace the public/private key pair as we have assumed that the DNSKEY is authenticated

So how can we ensure that the DNSKEY is from the authoritative name server ?

DNSSEC works around this is by signing the DNS replies at each step in the chain of response and reply. So when a domain name server queries another domain name server, not only is the expected result returned but also a flag indicating if that zone used DNSSEC and if it does it includes a hash of the DNSKEY record stored in a record called DS.

So far we have introduced 3 new resource records to DNS:

  • RRSIG – a hash of the other RRs that is encrypt using the private key by the authoritative name server
  • DNSKEY – the public key associated with the private key used to encrypt the RRSIG, a DNS resolver then using this public key to decypt the RRSIG and check that the plaintext is a hash of the other RRs
  • DS – a hash of the DNSKEY used in the zone that the DNS resolver is about to query so that the resolver can check that the response from the next name server query has not had the DNSKEY altered because it can check the DNSKEY received with DS received from the last name server.

This hash is then used when the name server queries the zone, as the DNSKEY returned hashed should match the DS RR from the previous query. If the response doesn’t include a DNSSEC RR or the DNSSEC hashed is not the same as the previously returned DS RR, then the integrity of the data has been comprised.
This diagram attempt to demonstrate how the chain of DS and DNSKEY allows use to assume that the DNSKEY has not been tampered with. In this example, a DNS resolver queries the root DNS name server and its returned with the normal DNS response as well as a DS resource record. This DS RR is a hash of the DNSKEY that will be returned then the next DNS request is made. The DNS resolver then queries a TLD name server, this returns the normal DNS response as well as a DNSKEY and another DS. Now the DNS resolver can check that the response was from the TLD name server by checking that the DS that is recieved prevously from the root DNS name server is a hash of the DNSKEY. The DNS resolver can now contiune as it has the DS, which is a hash of the DNSKEY that should be returned by the next name server

Figure 2 – DNSSEC chain of trust created using corresponding DS and DNSKEY RRs, this assumes that the response from the root DNS can be trusted


How does the DNS resolver know that it can trust the result from the root DNS server ?

In the above example we cant guarantee that response from the root DNS server is actually from the root DNS server, this is why we introduce a trust anchor

Figure 3 – chain of trust between a trush anchor and the authoriatative name server using a series of DS and RRSIG resource records

But this appears just to move the problem, how can we trust the trust anchor ?
We get the DS resource record using a different method where we don’t need to authenticate the origin as we know that the message can’t have been intercepted (i.e. via the operating system)

As you can see we have created a chain of trust using a series of corresponding DS records and DNSKEYs, this means that when we reach the authoriative DNS name server, we know that we can trust the DNSKEY and that is will not have been tampered with.

There is a fun website here, which provides information on the chain of trust.

Thing to consider in the next article:

  • What’s the difference between a validating and non-validating stud resolver, which is better ?
  • DNSSEC also introduces NSEC and NSEC3 resource records, what are these used for ?
  • DNSSEC requires use of the “DO” flag in  EDNS, why don’t the DNS resolvers just ignore the RRSIG. DNSKEY and DS resource records ?
  • What happens if the authoriative name server do not support DNSSEC, how does the resolver know the difference between DNS response from an authoriative name server that don’t use DNSSEC and a attach where the evil 3rd party tries to pretent the the authoriative name server dose not use DNSSEC
  • How exactly goes the trust anchor get the DS for DNS root, what happens if the root DNS needs to update the DNSKEY and therefore the DS record in the trust anchor, if for example the cyptographic algorithm is broken
  • How does a authoriative name server prove that an DNS entery don’t exist ?
  • In July 2010, the DNSSEC was added to the root DNS, could you use DNSSEC before the root DNS support DNSEC if all other name server and the resolver supported DNSSEC ? DNS Lookaside validation ?
  • What happens when a name server between the root and authoriate name server doesnt support DNSSEC but the other name server involved do ?
  • Why are there additional timestamps in the RRSIG to limit the time that the signiture is valid ?
  • Why are these timestamps absolute not relative like TTLs ?
  • How are new keys implemented and what about the caching?
  • Whats zome emuation and how can it be dealt with ?